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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
PURPOSE OF THE GUIDELINES  
 
1. A number of States have recognised the importance of robust domestic1 investigations into 
the lawfulness of their own actions in armed conflict. There are, however, significant 
differences between the various national legal frameworks and disparate practice across 
States in the way investigations are carried out. Clarity on a number of issues would appear 
to be useful, including the circumstances in which investigations should be triggered, the 
different forms investigations may take depending on the nature of an incident, and the 
principles and standards applicable during the investigative process. 
 
2. These Guidelines consider investigations into possible violations of international 
humanitarian law – the body of international rules governing armed conflict – from the 
perspective of existing international law, policy, and good practice. The intent is not to set 
forth a uniform investigative process for all States. Rather, the purpose is to identify and 
present – while remaining sensitive to the differences that characterise domestic legal and 
investigative systems – a range of practical and legal issues that can arise in investigations 
or should be considered beforehand. The aim is likewise to provide practical assistance by 
setting out a general framework for investigations in armed conflict and, where relevant, 
the corresponding international principles and standards. 
 
3. The text refers to “investigations in armed conflict” by way of shorthand. This term is used 
to denote investigations into possible violations of international humanitarian law, that is, 
acts in contravention of international humanitarian law with a nexus to an armed conflict, 
whether or not the investigations themselves are carried out during an armed conflict. 
Investigations undertaken during an armed conflict for acts not linked to the armed conflict 
are outside its scope. 
 
4. While the Guidelines are focused on investigations carried out into possible violations of 
international humanitarian law, they may also be useful for investigations into behaviour 
prohibited by international law not addressed in this text, such as genocide or crimes 
against humanity.  
 
5. The Guidelines deal with investigations by States into their own actions but, on occasion, 
consider the role of cooperation in multi-national military operations for various parts of 
an investigative process.2 They may also prove useful for actors other than States.3 
 
 
                                                                   
1 The terms “domestic” and “national” are used interchangeably in this text. 
2 Special considerations in relation to investigations may arise in the case of multi-national military 
operations, including UN peacekeeping operations, as regards, in particular, the sharing of information, as 
well as cooperation and relations with partner and host States. The Guidelines are not focused on the 
particularities of States operating in multi-national military settings, and the specific issues involved would 
require separate examination.  
3 In particular, organised non-State armed groups party to a non-international armed conflict. 
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STRUCTURE 
 
6. The text contains 16 Guidelines, each followed by a commentary. The Guidelines draw on 
common elements found in international law, domestic law and policy, and are informed 
by State practice. The commentaries aim to provide clarification on the meaning of the 
Guidelines and give further indication as to how they could be implemented in practice. 
The Guidelines are not a blueprint for a specific domestic system. Likewise, they do not – 
and cannot – relieve a State of its domestic, regional and international law obligations, the 
interpretation of which will require appropriate consideration in each case. 
 
7. Section I deals with the steps prior to the launching of an investigation in armed conflict. 
These include the recording of military operations, on-scene action, internal reporting and 
external allegations,4 and the assessment of facts.  
 
8. Section II deals with the standards applicable to criminal investigations of war crimes.5 The 
Guidelines address the standards of independence and impartiality, thoroughness, 
promptness, and transparency that make up an effective investigation, as they apply to 
criminal investigations. This section also covers fair trial guarantees in relation to 
investigations.  
 
9. Section III deals with administrative investigations in armed conflict. The Guidelines 
address the different types of non-criminal investigations into violations of international 
humanitarian law and how the standards of independence and impartiality, thoroughness, 
promptness, and transparency apply to such investigations. 
 
10. Section IV deals with how matters of State responsibility should be approached, the concept 
of policy-related violations of international humanitarian law and how they may be 
addressed, and the need to have legal advisors to the armed forces so that, inter alia, effective 
investigations can be carried out. 
 
WHY INVESTIGATE?  
 
11. There are both legal and non-legal reasons to conduct investigations in armed conflict. 
 
LEGAL REASONS 
 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW  
 
12. Investigations into possible violations of international humanitarian law are recognised as 
critical for the proper application of this body of norms in both international and non-
international armed conflict. Legal sources for a duty to investigate can be found in both 
treaty and customary international humanitarian law, inter alia in the obligation of the 
High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol 
I of 1977, applicable in international armed conflict, to enact any legislation necessary to 
provide effective penal sanctions for persons suspected of having committed or ordering the 
                                                                   
4 See para 48 of the Guidelines below.  
5 For how this term is used in the Guidelines, see para 14 below. 
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commission of “grave breaches” of their provisions.6 States have a legal obligation to search 
for such persons, regardless of their nationality, and to carry out criminal proceedings (or 
extradition under certain conditions), which necessarily includes investigations, so as to 
bring the perpetrators to justice. 
 
13. “Other serious violations of the laws and customs of war” – which may be committed in 
international or non-international armed conflict – is a legal term of art synonymous with 
“war crimes”. A list of such serious violations (which is wider than the concept of grave 
breaches), is provided for in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (in Article 8 (2) 
(b), (c), and (e))7 and is generally considered to reflect customary international law. This 
source of law requires that, in both international and non-international armed conflict, 
States investigate all war crimes committed by their nationals or on their territory, and 
other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, prosecute the 
suspects.8  
 
14. The term “war crime” is used further in this text to encompass both grave breaches of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol I, and other serious violations of the 
laws and customs of war9 that may be committed in international and non-international 
armed conflict and give rise to individual criminal responsibility. The term “violation” 
encompasses, in addition to war crimes, all other breaches of international humanitarian 
law that, under its rules, do not give rise to individual criminal responsibility.10  
 
15. It should be recalled that the Geneva Conventions distinguish between a State’s duty to 
“repress” grave breaches and its duty to “suppress” all other acts contrary to their 
provisions.11  
 
16. The term to “repress” is generally understood to encompass measures that will include 
individual criminal prosecutions for acts that must be criminalised under treaty and 
customary international humanitarian law. The term to “suppress” usually denotes the 
wide range of measures that States may take to address all other violations of the laws and 
customs of war, including violations that do not give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility, so as to ensure they cease, are prevented and that their reoccurrence is 
precluded. The notion of suppression also comprises administrative measures that States 
may take to deal with violations not amounting to war crimes, i.e. administrative 
investigations (see Guidelines 12 and 13).  
 
                                                                   
6 For treaty provisions see Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field [hereinafter “GCI”], 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, Article 49; Geneva 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea [hereinafter “GCII”], 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, Article 50; Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War [hereinafter “GCIII”], 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Article 
129; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War [hereinafter 
“GCIV”], 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, Article 146; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter “API”], 
8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS Article 85. For customary law see Henckaerts, J.-M. and Doswald-Beck, L., ICRC 
Customary International Humanitarian Law [hereinafter “ICRC Customary Law Study”] Rule 158. 
7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002) [hereinafter “ICC Statute”] Article 8. Article 8(a) 
repeats the grave breaches provisions of the four Geneva Conventions. See also ICRC Customary Law Study 
(above note 6) Rule 156 and commentary.  
8 ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rule 158. 
9 See para 13 of the Guidelines above. 
10 States are of course free to criminalise such violations (and many do) under domestic law.  
11 See GCI (above note 6) Article 49; GCII (above note 6) Article 50; GCIII (above note 6) Article 129; GCIV 
(above note 6) Article 146; API (above note 6) Articles 85(1) and 86(1).  
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17. Certain other international treaties also provide for the obligation of States parties to take 
appropriate measures to deal with violations of their provisions, including the Hague 
Cultural Property Convention and its Second Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
the Amended Landmines Protocol, the Ottawa Convention on Landmines, and the Dublin 
Convention on Cluster Munitions.12 
 
OTHER BRANCHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
18. The legal sources for a duty to investigate acts committed in armed conflict can also be 
found in other branches of international law. Certain international human rights law 
treaties explicitly provide for a duty to investigate specific human rights violations,13 with 
provisions that have been further developed through the interpretations of human rights 
bodies.14 International and regional human rights treaties have likewise been interpreted 
by relevant bodies as containing a general requirement to investigate alleged violations to 
give effect to the rights provided for.15 
 
19. Under international criminal law, investigations are necessarily required as part of the duty 
to prosecute certain crimes under international law.16 Moreover, investigations are an 
important element of the complementarity principle under the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: a State Party must carry out an effective investigation into alleged crimes 
covered by the Statute in order to preclude the Court’s jurisdiction.17  
 
20. Investigations are also referred to in human rights “soft law” and other non-treaty 
standards,18 and are commonly called for by UN bodies, including the General Assembly and 
the Human Rights Council, by regional human rights bodies, and others. 
                                                                   
12 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954) 249 UNTS 240, 
Article 7; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict (1999) 38 ILM 769, Articles 15-17; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (1993) 1974 UNTS 45, 
Article VII(1); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Amended Protocol II 
(1996) 35 ILM 1206, Article 14; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997) 36 ILM 1507, Article 9; Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, (2008) 48 ILM 357, Article 9. 
13 This includes the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984) UNTS 1465, Article 6; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance (2006) Article 12; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985) 
Article 8; Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994) Article VI.  
14 UN Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment)” (10 March 1992) para 14; UN Human Rights 
Committee, “General Comment No. 36 on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, on the right to life” (10 October 2018), CCPR/C/GC/36, paras 27-29; Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Judgment, 29 July 1988, (Ser. C) No. 4, paras 166-181; Santo Domingo 
Massacre v Colombia, (Ser. C) No. 259, Judgment of 30 November 2012 (Preliminary objections, merits and 
reparations) paras 154-173; European Court of Human Rights: Isayeva v Russia, Judgment, 24 February 2005 
(57950/00) paras 209-214; Al-Skeini v UK, Judgment, 7 July 2011 (55721/07) paras 161-167. 
15 E.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter “ICCPR”] (1966) UNTS 999, 
Article 2.2 as interpreted by the Human Rights Committee in “General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant” (26 May 
2004), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, paras 8 and 15. 
16 ICC Statute (above note 7) preamble, para 6. 
17 ICC Statute (above note 7) Articles 17-18. 
18 ECOSOC, Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary 
Executions (1989) para 9; UN OHCHR, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
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STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
21. The military of a State is an organ of the State and its acts are attributable to the State. A 
violation of international humanitarian law committed by one (or more) members of the 
armed forces may thus give rise to the responsibility of the relevant State.19 An obvious 
example is where a member of the armed forces commits a war crime.20 State responsibility 
for violations of international humanitarian law can arise even where no individual 
responsibility can be established (e.g., if adequate structures for compliance with the law 
were not in place). 
 
22. A State has a duty under international humanitarian law to comply with its rules (to 
“respect and ensure respect for them in all circumstances”).21 This is a “primary rule” under 
the international law of State responsibility,22 which will be breached when a member of 
the armed forces violates the law. 
 
23. In consequence, under the “secondary rules” of State responsibility, a State must take all 
relevant measures to cease an ongoing violation of international humanitarian law, ensure 
its non-repetition and make appropriate reparation.23 An investigation will in many cases 
be a preliminary step to any such action and is thus essential.24 
 
                                                                   
Enforcement Officials (1990); Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law [hereinafter “Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation”], Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly, 16 December 2005, A/RES/60/147, para 22; Principles of International Co-
operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 3 December 1973, A/RES/3020(XXVIII), 
para 1. 
19 UN International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
[hereinafter “Articles on State Responsibility”] Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1 (2001), adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in Resolution A/RES/62/61 (8 January 2008) Article 4; GCI (above note 6) Article 
51; GCII (above note 6) Article 52; GCIII (above note 6) Article 131; GCIV (above note 6) Article 148; API 
(above note 6) Article 91. See also ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rule 149. 
20 State responsibility for conduct attributable to it will arise in other cases as well (see Articles on State 
Responsibility (above note 19), Articles 2-11). A State is also responsible for the acts of members of State 
organs other than the military, e.g., the security services or the gendarmerie (see Articles on State 
Responsibility, Article 5). A State will likewise be responsible for the conduct of a person or group of persons 
if the person or group is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the State 
carrying out the conduct (see Articles on State Responsibility, Article 8). 
21 Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions 1949 (above note 6); Pictet, J. S. (ed.), Commentary on 
the First Geneva Convention, ICRC (1952) [hereinafter “Pictet Commentary”] p. 26; ICRC Commentary on 
the First Geneva Convention (2016) [hereinafter “ICRC 2016 Commentary”] para 118; International Court 
of Justice: Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA), 
Judgment of 27 June 1986 (Merits), para 220. 
22 International Law Commission, Commentary to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third 
session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001), vol. II, Part Two, p. 31, para 1. 
23 Articles on State Responsibility (above note 19) Articles 30-31; International Court of Justice, Case 
Concerning Armed Activities on The Territory of The Congo (Democratic Republic of The Congo v Uganda), 
Judgment of 19 December 2005, paras 255-259. 
24 Where violations of the law are committed by a non-State armed group party to a non-international armed 
conflict whose actions cannot be attributed to the State, a State may still have certain obligations regarding 
the prevention of violations and the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators. This may also presuppose 
an investigation. See International Law Commission, Commentary to the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility (above note 19) p. 39 para 4. 
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24. State responsibility may also arise in relation to individuals or other entities harmed by a 
violation of another branch of international law which provides that they are the direct 
holders of rights (e.g., individuals under international human rights law). The specific form 
of reparation due, which may often include compensation, will depend on the source of law 
and procedure involved. 
 
25. Domestically, a State’s responsibility may take the form of civil liability for harm 
committed to individuals or entities by the armed forces. The extent to which, and the 
specific ways in which, the civil liability of a State may be established in domestic 
proceedings (judicial or other), and the remedies available, will vary according to the 
domestic legal system.25 
 
NON-LEGAL REASONS  
 
26. The existence of effective domestic procedures and mechanisms for investigations in armed 
conflict serves to enhance a State’s military operational effectiveness. Investigations may be 
a source of information on the success or failure of military operations and enable 
appropriate steps to be taken in the latter case. They can likewise assist in the identification 
of good practice and lessons-learned. Ultimately, investigations are crucial for maintaining 
discipline in an institution that depends on high levels of command and control. 
 
27. Investigations are also a form of accountability to a State’s own population, to victims of 
violations of international humanitarian law and their next of kin, the population of 
another territory in which a State’s military may be operating, as well as to the international 
community. They can demonstrate that a State is adhering to its international obligations – 
either by clarifying that international humanitarian law was not violated or by 
demonstrating that the State is addressing an alleged violation of the law and taking 
appropriate corrective action. Showing a genuine effort to comply with the law and 
rejecting impunity for violations may, for example, increase trust in the military’s actions. 
Proper investigations of alleged violations can also facilitate transition to peace as there is 
likely to be more clarity on certain events and the corrective action that has been, or still 
needs to be, taken. The fact that a State is striving to implement its international legal 
obligations also promotes the overall credibility of the law. 
 
28. The parties to an armed conflict will often direct accusations of violations of international 
humanitarian law against each other in order to, for example, achieve political, 
psychological, propaganda, or other goals. This can include mutual recriminations over the 
way in which the law is being interpreted or applied by the other side. Effective 
investigations are crucial for a credible response to such claims. They may also serve to 
reduce the risk that the parties will engage in an escalating series of further violations that 
each side seeks to justify as a response to the other’s actions.  
 
29. Taking steps to determine whether a violation of international humanitarian law has 
occurred, and if so, to remedy it, is the primary responsibility of States. It should be noted, 
however, that when accountability failures occur or are thought to have occurred, 
international or regional bodies and processes (such as fact-finding missions, commissions 
of inquiry, tribunals), may be triggered to examine events and recommend or require action. 
                                                                   
25 It should be noted that in domestic legal proceedings, whether criminal or civil in nature, a violation of 
international humanitarian law (e.g., the grave breach of wilfully killing of a prisoner of war) may be 
classified and dealt with as a crime under domestic law (e.g., murder). 
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Effective domestic investigations would preclude, or at least limit, the need to resort to 
external engagement.  
 
BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION 
 
30. Regardless of its nature, an investigation needs to be effective. The term “effective” is not 
presented here as a legal term of art, as it does not have an agreed definition. It has been used 
generically in many contexts to indicate that a process must be appropriate and undertaken 
in good faith, with all feasible means employed to achieve its goal.  
 
31. As noted above, the grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol I state that the High Contracting Parties must provide “effective penal 
sanctions”;26 other international treaties require that States provide for “effective remedies” 
for violations of the relevant law;27 and ad hoc criminal courts and human rights bodies have 
issued judgments or decisions on the obligation to carry out “effective investigations”.28 
Non-treaty instruments adopted by the UN General Assembly have likewise reiterated the 
requirement of an effective investigation.29 
 
32. For the purpose of these Guidelines an investigation must be effective insofar as it should 
be capable of enabling a determination of whether there was a violation of international 
humanitarian law, of identifying the individual and systemic factors that caused or 
contributed to an incident, and of laying the ground for any remedial action that may be 
required. The Guidelines draw on the internationally recognised principles most 
commonly required for the effectiveness of an investigation30 and elucidate their practical 
application to investigations in armed conflict. The principles referred to are: 
independence, impartiality, thoroughness and promptness. A fifth principle, that of 
transparency, is also deemed to be applicable to investigations in armed conflict, albeit in a 
modified form. 
 
33. While an underlying requirement for investigations can be extrapolated from international 
humanitarian law, this body of law has very few provisions on the specific way in which 
investigations should be carried out. International human rights law bodies have had an 
opportunity to more precisely elaborate on this matter and also on how the general 
principles of an effective investigation should be implemented. These bodies have indicated 
                                                                   
26 See note 6 above.  
27 ICCPR (above note 15) Article 2(3)(a); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) ETS 5, Article 13. 
28 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [hereinafter “ICTY”]: Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski 
and Johan Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber Judgment (IT-04-83-T) (10 July 2008) para 418; Prosecutor v Pavle 
Strugar, Trial Chamber II Judgment (IT-01-42-T) (31 January 2005) para 376; European Court of Human 
Rights: Al-Skeini v UK, Judgment, 7 July 2011 (55721/07) para 166; Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Acosta et al v Nicaragua (2017) para 136; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Sudan Human 
Rights Organisation and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions v Sudan (2009) para 147. 
29 See Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation (above note 18) Principle III.  
30 See e.g., “Second Report of the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010: 
Israel’s Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of 
Armed Conflict According to International Law” [hereinafter “2nd Turkel Report”] pp. 114-148, paras 63-112; 
Human Rights Council, “Report of the Committee of independent experts in international humanitarian 
and human rights laws to monitor and assess any domestic, legal or other proceedings undertaken by both 
the Government of Israel and the Palestinian side, in the light of General Assembly resolution 254/64 
including the independence, effectiveness, genuineness of these investigations and their conformity with 
international standards” (2010), A/HRC/15/50, para 21.  
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that the fulfilment of the respective requirements should be assessed taking into account 
the specific circumstances of armed conflict.31  
 
34. There should be no fundamental difference between the general principles of an effective 
investigation in armed conflict and outside it, as their application will depend on what is 
feasible in each situation.32 The findings of authorities in both international human rights 
law and international criminal law have therefore been consulted, where appropriate, in 
the drafting of the Guidelines to interpret the relevant international humanitarian law 
rules and to inform their practical implementation. 
 
CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY 
 
35. States have a myriad of diverse approaches to domestic investigations in armed conflict. 
Some investigative systems provide for distinct and consecutive phases to investigations of 
possible violations of international humanitarian law, while others merge certain stages. 
As a result, the wording used by States and their militaries varies significantly and cannot 
necessarily be transposed from one system to another. Different terminology is likewise 
used in the branches of international law mentioned above. 
 
36. The terminology set forth below encompasses different types, stages and elements of 
investigations through reliance on terms that were believed to best encapsulate the purpose 
of a particular investigation type, stage or element. While these terms are used consistently 
in the Guidelines, it should be noted that similar uniformity will not be found in the law 
and practice of different States. 
 
37. The definitions of concepts and terms provided below are solely for the purpose of these 
Guidelines and do not purport to have any agreed legal meaning beyond this document. As 
noted above, the aim of the Guidelines is not to suggest a structure or terminology to be 
shared by all States, but rather to provide guidance on certain practical and legal issues 
relevant to the various investigative systems regardless of the particular terminology in use 
domestically. 
 
COMMANDER  
 
38. The term “commander” is used in the Guidelines to designate any person with command 
responsibility over subordinates in a military hierarchy, i.e. in its generic meaning. It may, 
in other words, denote a commander at any level. 
 
39. A military commander can be held individually criminally responsible for directly carrying 
out or ordering the commission of a war crime.33 
                                                                   
31 European Court of Human Rights: Al-Skeini v UK, Judgment, 7 July 2011 (55721/07) para 168; Bazorkina v 
Russia, Judgment, 27 July 2006 (69481/01) para 121; Jaloud v The Netherlands, 20 November 2014 (47708-08) 
para 186. 
32 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Civil 
and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions (8 March 2006), 
E/CN.4/2006/53, para 36; Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (29 July 
1988), (Ser. C) No. 4, para 177; European Court of Human Rights: Al-Skeini v UK, Judgment, 7 July 2011 
(55721/07) para 164; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Zimbabwe NGO Human Rights 
Forum v Zimbabwe (245/02) para 210. 
33 See GCI (above note 6) Article 49; GCII (above note 6) Article 50; GCIII (above note 6) Article 129; GCIV 
(above note 6) Article 146; ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rule 152. A person may "commit" a 
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40. Commensurate with their level of responsibility, commanders have a duty to ensure that 
members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under 
international humanitarian law.34 
 
41. In addition, commanders have a duty to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and 
report to competent authorities violations of international humanitarian law rules, 
including with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other 
persons under their control.35  
 
42. A commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under their control are going 
to commit or have committed a violation of international humanitarian law is obliged to 
initiate steps necessary to prevent violations and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary 
or criminal action against the violators.36 
 
43. The fact that a violation was committed by a subordinate does not absolve their superiors 
from responsibility if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to 
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or was 
going to commit such a violation and if they did not take all feasible measures within their 
power to prevent or repress the breach.37 Thus, a failure to carry out appropriate action in 
respect of possible war crimes may likewise give rise to the individual criminal 
responsibility of a commander.38 
 
44. It should be noted that in certain domestic systems an authority other than a commander 
(a superior authority) may have duties related to investigations, while not necessarily 
possessing actual command responsibility (e.g., to discipline subordinates). This is also 
provided for in international criminal law39 and international humanitarian law.40 
 
RECORDING 
 
45. The “recording” of information comprises the collection, documentation and retention of 
information related to military operations. Recording is an ongoing process and has 
purposes beyond the gathering of information for a possible investigation. 
 
REPORTING  
 
46. “Reporting” is the transmission of information on an incident following either direct 
observation, the receipt of information from subordinates or through recording processes, 
or external allegations. 
 
                                                                   
crime by different modes of participation provided for in domestic and international criminal law (for the 
latter see e.g., ICC Statute (above note 7) Article 25), issues that are outside the scope of this text. 
34 API (above note 6) Article 87(2). 
35 API (above note 6) Article 87(1). 
36 API (above note 6) Article 87(3). 
37 API (above note 6) Article 86(2). See also ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rule 153. 
38 ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rule 153. 
39 See ICC Statute (above note 7) Article 28.  
40 See ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rules 152 and 153.  
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INCIDENT 
 
47. An “incident” is broadly speaking any event, situation, or set of circumstances that has the 
potential to require an investigation because it raises concern about a possible violation of 
international humanitarian law. It can also be an unexpected or undesired occurrence that 
does not immediately raise concern about a possible violation but, given the circumstances, 
may warrant an investigation (e.g., if it suggests inadequate rules of engagement, 
insufficient training for detention operations, or a weapons malfunction), all of which 
could lead to violations in the future even if they did not initially occur.  
 
48. An incident may be internally brought to attention through or by the military chain of 
command or via other State institutions, or may be brought to attention by means of an 
external allegation. The terms “internal” (reporting) and “external” (allegations) are used 
throughout this text to distinguish between reports made within the military and other 
State institutions on the one hand (“internal”), and those coming from external actors such 
as members of a civilian population, international, or civil society organisations on the 
other (“external”) (for more, see Guidelines 4 and 5 below).  
 
49. Internally, incidents can include both reportable incidents (those that must be 
communicated to a higher authority for assessment or other action), and non-reportable 
incidents (those that may be actioned by the commander, e.g., with disciplinary 
procedures). This is distinct from whether or not an incident is recorded.  
 
ASSESSMENT 
 
50. The term “assessment” is used to describe the process leading to a decision on the action that 
should be taken in response to an incident, regardless of whether the incident was brought 
to attention internally or externally.  
 
51. The purpose of an assessment is to determine whether an investigation is needed and, if so, 
establish the type that should be opened or, depending on the circumstances, whether more 
facts may be needed in order to decide on the launching of an investigation and its type.  
 
52. An assessment can take different forms and is not usually linear: it can be triggered by the 
decision of a single individual or be the result of multiple decisions involving different 
actors taken subsequently or in parallel to one another.  
 
INVESTIGATION 
 
53. “Investigation” is used to denote activity which has the purpose of establishing the facts 
surrounding an incident in order to allow for a subsequent determination of individual 
and/or State responsibility for a possible violation of international humanitarian law. The 
activities undertaken and the procedure provided for will comprise the investigative 
proceedings. 
 
54. Within this broad definition of investigation, a distinction is drawn in the Guidelines 
between two types of investigations: criminal and administrative.  
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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
 
55. A criminal investigation is one aimed at determining the facts surrounding an incident so 
as to enable the establishment of possible individual criminal responsibility for conduct 
prohibited by law, and of the criminal sanction(s) that may be required. For the State 
responsibility aspects see Guidelines 741 and 14 below. 
 
56. As mentioned, under international humanitarian law States are under an obligation to 
prosecute persons suspected of having committed war crimes. Domestic law cannot be 
relied on to absolve a State from implementing its international legal obligations, including 
those provided for in international humanitarian law. 
 
57. In practice, many States have domestically criminalised a much broader range of offences 
that may be committed in armed conflict than the war crimes provided for in international 
humanitarian law.42 While all criminal offences must be subject to criminal investigation, 
the focus here is only the investigation of criminal offences that constitute war crimes 
under international humanitarian law. It should be noted that in some national systems 
criminal sanctions are also provided for certain acts that constitute disciplinary offences.43 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS 
 
58. An administrative investigation is one aimed at determining the facts surrounding an 
incident to establish whether there was a non-criminal violation of international 
humanitarian law, and consider any individual and/or State responsibility that may arise. 
 
59. Administrative investigations are one way in which States can fulfil their obligation to 
suppress violations of international humanitarian law that are not war crimes.44 This type 
of proceeding can be conducted prior to, in parallel with, or following a criminal 
investigation, in order to, for example, address issues linked to an incident that are not of a 
criminal, but of an operational, policy, or disciplinary nature. 
 
60. In some domestic systems, certain administrative investigations deliberately exclude the 
possibility of looking into individual responsibility for an incident (e.g., in order to 
encourage frankness by those who were involved).45 For the purpose of these Guidelines, 
however, administrative investigations include proceedings that aim to, inter alia, establish 
individual, non-criminal responsibility for an incident. Such proceedings can take many 
forms in practice. 
 
 
 
                                                                   
41 See para 134 below. 
42 In the majority of cases these offences are tried as domestic offences and not violations of international 
humanitarian law. Examples include criminalising the failure to take feasible precautions in attack, 
looting, theft, simple assault, the taking of artefacts or trophies of war. 
43 The term “disciplinary offence” has different connotations in different investigative systems; the 
Guidelines do not attempt to address the full scope of possible disciplinary violations under domestic law 
or the mechanisms to deal with them. See commentary to Guideline 12.  
44 See paras 13-16 above. 
45 Such proceedings are often focused on fixing a human error or detecting defective equipment and 
preventing repetition, rather than attributing individual responsibility. 
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FEASIBILITY 
 
61. “Feasibility” refers to action that is practicable or practically possible taking into account 
all the circumstances prevailing at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations.46 This standard is particularly important in situations of armed conflict 
which may involve a rapid change of circumstances on the ground (e.g., preventing access 
to the scene of an incident or witness interviews). The standard of feasibility must be 
applied in good faith and cannot be relied on to preclude an investigation as such, given that 
certain investigative measures should always be possible. Where appropriate, the 
commentary to the Guidelines will specify what may be relevant to take into account in a 
feasibility assessment.  
 
SYSTEMIC ISSUES 
 
62. An issue is considered systemic if the underlying causes of an incident are likely to have led 
to or could lead to further incidents. Systemic issues can surface in a single unit, across 
multiple units, and at any level within the military. Investigating systemic issues can be 
part of the duty to prevent or cease a violation of international humanitarian law, avoid its 
reoccurrence, and/or take appropriate remedial action. Systemic issues may arise without 
any intent to commit violations or fault that could be attributed to a specific person or body. 
 
POLICY-RELATED VIOLATIONS 
 
63. Policy-related violations are a type of systemic issue and will often involve multiple and/or 
severe acts contrary to international humanitarian law. Two scenarios may be 
distinguished. The first is a case in which the cause of an incident – or incidents – lies in an 
explicit or implicit policy to violate international humanitarian law. The second is a case in 
which there is wilful disregard for ongoing reports, allegations and/or information that 
international humanitarian law is being violated.  
                                                                   
46 See Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C., Zimmermann, B. (eds.), Commentary to the Additional Protocols of 8 June 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 [hereinafter “ICRC Commentary to API”], Martinus 
Nijhoff (1987) to Article 57 API, para 2198.  
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GUIDELINES 
 
I THE TRIGGERING PROCESS 
 
64. This section covers steps prior to and necessary to trigger an investigation, from the 
recording of military operations to an assessment that an investigation is needed. These first 
steps will be critical to the effectiveness of any subsequent investigation. 
 
65. Guideline 1 covers the recording of military operations. Recording activities are separate 
from the investigative process inasmuch as they should be carried out regardless of any 
incident. When an incident occurs, recording will be an essential pre-requisite for many 
subsequent investigative steps. 
 
66. Guidelines 2 to 5 deal with actions that should be undertaken immediately following an 
incident. The Guidelines cover action necessary at the scene of an incident, reporting 
requirements, as well as internal reporting and external allegations procedures.  
 
67. Guideline 6 describes the assessment process. This is the process within which a decision 
is, inter alia, made on whether to open an investigation following an incident (regardless of 
the way in which it was brought to attention: internally or externally). The Guideline 
addresses the circumstances under which a criminal or an administrative investigation 
should be launched, and other possible assessment outcomes. 
 
GUIDELINE 1: RECORDING 
 
Military operations should be recorded at the earliest possible time. The scope of recording 
may depend on the feasibility of doing so in the circumstances.  
COMMENTARY: 
 
68. The “recording” of information comprises the collection, documentation, and retention of 
information related to military operations (the “capturing” of information). Outside of 
investigations it serves to assess the effects of operational activity, to enable lessons-learned, 
and to help detect systemic issues, all of which, in turn, can improve operational 
effectiveness and contribute to the success of future operations. It is important that the 
planning of military operations also be part of record-keeping. 
 
69. Recording should, for example, be made of unplanned use of force or unexpected/undesired 
consequence of the use of force; civilian casualties/harm; property damage/harm; detention 
activities; planned operational success and effects. It is good practice to record special 
instructions, applicable rules of engagement, soldier cards, tactical guidance, the training 
provided, those involved in the decision-making processes, and the context of operations. 
 
70. The chain of command should ensure that recording is carried out. The realities of armed 
conflict may make recording difficult, meaning that the amount and type of feasible 
recording will differ depending on the circumstances. Given the importance of capturing 
information related to military operations, the criterion of feasibility should not be used as 
an excuse not to record, but prioritisation of resources may be necessary in this regard. 
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71. In the context of investigations, recording is important for determining whether an incident 
needs to be investigated. The capturing of information serves to help reconstruct what 
happened and whether appropriate action was taken at the time of an incident. Such 
information will, among other things, be important for responding to internal reports or 
external allegations that may arise following an incident, including one that was not 
initially deemed problematic.  
 
72. Recorded information related to an incident should include: what happened, who did what, 
where, as well as the time, date and unit(s) involved. All cases of capture and detention of 
persons must be recorded.47 Examples of the different formats in which information can be 
recorded include post-mission debriefs, after-action reviews, contact reports, mission 
reports, data accumulated by operation centres, detention logs, strike logs, electronic 
communications, and targeting packages. Some of these records will be generated 
automatically, in which case recording will involve simply retaining the information. 
 
73. Information can be recorded via written, photographic, audio, video, or electronic means. It 
should be stored, with due attention paid to data protection and privacy concerns, and, if 
relevant, archived in suitable conditions, with the ability to be retrieved if necessary. 
 
74. Information should be recorded at the earliest possible time given the operational context. 
This means that the time-frame within which recording is done may differ between, for 
example, deliberate (pre-planned) operations versus dynamic operations (those responding 
to immediate circumstantial requirements or opportunities). 
 
75. Adequate training and guidance are critical to the success of recording and should be 
provided to persons with that responsibility. Training on effective recording should be 
organised as part of exercises prior to armed conflict or deployment. Persons tasked with 
recording may need particular operational knowledge and expertise to accurately observe 
the causes and effects of an incident. Training should include what information is useful to 
record and how recording should be done. 
 
76. Military regulations should determine who is tasked with recording. Recording procedures 
should be adapted to the capabilities of those who will be recording (e.g., the literacy levels 
of persons expected to record) and to the conditions within which they are expected to 
operate (e.g., the equipment and technology available). Timelines, as well as procedures for 
preserving the integrity of recorded information and its storage, should likewise be set out 
beforehand. 
 
77. A range of units may have material which is relevant to a military operation, such as aircraft 
imagery, intelligence intercepts, or information relating to the transfer of detainees from the 
point of capture to a detention facility. In the case of an incident, the unit involved may need 
to reach out to other units that may have such additional information. In multi-national 
military operations, a procedure for information-sharing related to possible incidents 
should be established in advance, within reasonable expectations, given the challenges of 
verification of the material shared and classification of information recorded. 
 
  
                                                                   
47 See also para 108 below. 
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GUIDELINE 2: ACTIONS AT THE SCENE OF AN INCIDENT 
 
A commander present at the scene of an incident should take all feasible steps to ensure the 
securing and preservation of relevant information and evidence if more appropriate 
authorities are not available.  
COMMENTARY: 
 
78. The securing and preservation of information and evidence are key to establishing that a 
violation of international humanitarian law has occurred, and may be equally essential to 
establishing that no violation has taken place. Certain steps such as the collection of 
evidence are highly dependent on expert and prompt action. A commander may therefore 
be required to carry out certain safeguarding actions such as securing the scene of an 
incident, documenting it with photographs, drawings, video recording or audio description, 
collecting and preserving other evidence, identifying possible victims and witnesses, and 
collecting statements from them and members of their own armed forces.  
 
79. On-scene commanders should be given specific training on what sort of action should be 
taken at the scene of an incident in order to secure and preserve evidence for any potential 
investigation. While it should be recognised that this task is additional to the primary role 
of a commander, it will on occasion be necessary for it to be performed, and properly so.48 
Commanders should in all cases be instructed in how not to jeopardise a possible 
investigation, which should include being given basic information on how to maintain the 
chain of custody of evidence and treat potential victims and witnesses. 
 
80. The expectations on the commander should be held to what is feasible given the 
circumstances, including the specific mission, the accessibility of the relevant site, the 
security situation, and available resources.49 
 
81. In cases of suspected criminal behaviour, more appropriate military or civilian law 
enforcement agencies, where they exist, should be included as soon as possible. A 
commander’s on-scene actions should not hinder the prompt involvement of such 
investigative bodies. 
 
GUIDELINE 3: REPORTING 
 
Any incident must be promptly reported by a commander to the competent authority for 
assessment.  
COMMENTARY: 
 
82. “Reporting” is the transmission of information on an incident following either direct 
observation, the receipt of information from subordinates or through recording processes, 
or external allegations. The purpose of reporting is to draw attention to an incident which, 
in turn, may trigger the first steps of an investigation. 
 
83. Military commanders have a legal obligation to report violations of international 
humanitarian law to the competent authority (see Guideline 6). Three types of reporting 
obligations may, generally speaking, be identified: i) incidents that must be reported because 
                                                                   
48 ICRC Commentary to API (above note 46) Article 87, para 3563. 
49 In this context see also para 133 of the Guidelines below. 
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they involve suspected war crimes under international humanitarian law, such as the 
killing of prisoners of war, deliberate and direct attacks against civilians, perfidy; ii) 
incidents in which it is not clear that a violation of international humanitarian law has been 
committed but where the circumstances indicate that this may be the case, such as a failure 
to take precautions in attack; and iii) situations that involve no violation of international 
humanitarian law but that nonetheless require reporting for legal and operational reasons, 
such as the capture and detention of persons. It is good practice to provide for a wider range 
of situations that may require reporting as well, which some systems do.50 
 
84. Military manuals often provide guidance on the actions or incidents that should be reported, 
with some listing and defining specific examples of “reportable incidents” as a useful way of 
operationalising commanders’ reporting obligations.51 
                                                                   
50 See note 51 below.  
51 Examples of reportable incidents or equivalent:  
• Argentina: Commanders are obliged to report violations of the Conventions and Protocol I, if 
necessary, to the competent authorities. [Manual de Derecho Internacional de los Conflictos 
Armados, 2010, para 2.06, p. 37]. 
• Australia: “Notifiable incidents” include reasonable suspicion that a disciplinary offence has been 
committed (excluding minor disciplinary matters); reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence has 
been committed; any death, serious injury, disappearance of civilian; death, serious injury of 
disappearance of an “enemy combatant” in custody or under effective control. [DOD, Defence 
Instructions (General), Admin 45-2: The reporting and management of notifiable incidents, para 6]. 
• Burundi: Each soldier has the obligation to report violations of international humanitarian law. 
[Règlement sur le DIH, 2007, para VIII.2.1]. 
• Canada: Officers must “report to the proper authority any infringement of the pertinent statutes, 
regulations, rules, orders and instructions governing the conduct of any person subject to the Code of 
Service Discipline when the officer cannot deal adequately with the matter.” [Queen’s Regulations 
and Orders 4.02(1)]. 
• France: incidents which must be reported to higher authorities by military authorities include 16 
categories of “serious incidents” [“Evengrave”], including serious accidents, allegations of criminal 
offences, and incidents which cause concern due to their nature, persons implicated or potential 
consequences. [Bulletin Officiel des Armées, Instruction N° 1950/DEF/CAB/SDBC/CPAG fixant la 
conduite à tenir par les autorités militaires et civiles en cas d'accidents ou d'incidents survenus au sein 
du ministère de la défense ou des établissements publics qui en dépendent (6 February 2004)].  
• Mexico: Commanders have the obligation to […] prevent any violation of [the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocol I], to repress them and, if necessary, to report them to the competent authorities. [Manual 
de DIH para el ejercito YFAM, 2009, para 173]. 
• Netherlands: After witnessing a possible violation of international humanitarian law, MoD 
personnel must report this to the Royal Marechaussee; A commander must report any crime 
committed by their subordinates to the Royal Marechaussee; Any use of force in military operations 
must be reported in the chain of command. The authorised commander must submit an After Action 
Report in the chain of command. A copy of this report is sent to the Public Prosecution Service via the 
Royal Marechaussee. [2nd Turkel Report (above note 30) Annex, pp. 925-930]. 
• Peru: Report acts or facts that constitute war crimes and enforce criminal and disciplinary 
responsibility for such crimes committed by superiors and subordinates, applying article 87 of 
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions. [Manual para las fuerzas armadas, 2010, p. 222]. 
• South Africa: All soldiers must be aware of their responsibility to report war crimes, which are 
breaches of the LOAC. Normally the report should be made to the next senior in the chain of 
command. A report may also be made to the Military Police, a Legal Officer or a Chaplain. [Revised 
Civic Education Manual, 2004, para 58]. 
• UK: Examples of Schedule 2 offences (reported to Service Police) include murder, manslaughter, 
kidnapping, inflicting GBH [grievous bodily harm], cruelty to children, infanticide, grave breaches, 
threatening with offensive weapon in public, robbery, torture, certain terrorism acts, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide. [Armed Forces Act (2006) Section 113; Schedule 2 offences as 
defined, pp. 198-200]. 
18 
 
85. In many States all members of the military (in addition to commanders) have a duty to 
report and it is good practice for legislation or military regulations to provide for that. 
Reports from subordinates can serve as an additional source of information on violations 
that will enable a commander to fulfil their legal obligation to report incidents to the 
competent authority for assessment. 
 
86. The commander must ensure that reporting procedures are in place and that reporting is 
carried out.52 Reporting structures and guidance should be provided to commanders prior to 
armed conflict or deployment, with clear criteria on what to report, what details to provide, 
when, and to whom. Failure to report must always be addressed and, where appropriate, be 
subject to sanctions. 
 
87. It should be recalled that a failure to carry out appropriate action in respect of possible war 
crimes may give rise to the individual criminal responsibility of a commander. The duty to 
report may be seen as a particularly important step in this regard. 
 
88. Reported information should include as appropriate: what happened, who did what, where, 
and the time, date and unit(s) involved, as well as other information and/or details the 
commander may have been apprised of or personally observed. Reporting obligations 
should be undertaken as soon as feasible after an incident, taking into account the 
circumstances, including available communications capabilities.  
 
89. Reportable information should be passed on to a person or body with the competence to 
make an assessment, which will depend on the national system. This will often be “up” the 
chain of command. It should be stressed that the competent authority may depend on the 
nature of the incident, and may also change as information is passed on and facts are 
clarified. Importantly, the reporting obligation continues until the appropriate level of 
assessment is reached (see Guideline 6 for details). 
 
90. There are certain types of non-criminal violations of international humanitarian law for 
which the commander may be the competent authority under domestic law (see e.g., 
Guideline 12). It would still be desirable to maintain a reporting obligation in such cases. A 
commander’s report would then be submitted for information and lessons-learned 
processes, rather than for referral to a competent authority for assessment.53 
                                                                   
• USA: Reportable Incidents: “A possible, suspected or alleged violation of the law of war for which 
there is credible information, or conduct during military operations other than war that would 
constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict.” [Chairman of the Joint 
Chief of Staff Instruction, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program, CJCSI 5810.01D (2010) 
para 6(f)(4)(e)(2)CJCS; DoD Instruction 6055.07, “Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record 
Keeping” (3 October 2000) Table 10 “Special Reporting Group Notification Requirements”]. 
52 A commander’s reporting obligations are explicitly provided for in international humanitarian law and in 
many military manuals. See API (above note 6) Article 87(1); ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) 
commentary to Rule 153 and State Practice relating to Rules 153 and 158; ICTY: Prosecutor v Vujadin Popovi 
et al, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 30 January 2015 (IT-05-88-A) para 1932-1941; Prosecutor v Delali, 
Judgment, Case NO IT-920210T, 16 November 1998, para 770; International Criminal Court [hereinafter 
“ICC”]: Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Trial Chamber III Judgment (21 March 2016) para 727. 
53 For example, a commander notices their subordinates are failing to adequately separate men and women 
in a detention centre and carries out an investigation into the causes of the violation in order to suppress it 
and prevent its reoccurrence. The commander is the competent authority to suppress the violation through 
investigative action, but also reports the information and corrective action taken through the chain of 
command for information. 
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GUIDELINE 4: INTERNAL REPORTING 
 
An internal process should be in place for persons other than a commander to report 
incidents through the chain of command or to corresponding law enforcement agencies 
where they exist. Individuals must be free to make such reports without fear of retribution. 
COMMENTARY:  
 
91. Persons other than a commander – who, as discussed above, clearly has reporting obligations 
– should be able to report incidents which they believe indicate a violation of international 
humanitarian law. This should include all members of the armed forces, civilian employees 
and contracted personnel under the authority of the armed forces. An internal process for 
submitting reports should be available and made known by the military, so as to ensure that 
all incidents are brought to the attention of a competent authority and that appropriate 
assessment of whether an investigation is required may be made. Internal reports may also 
involve information on an incident that a commander did not consider problematic at the 
time. 
 
92. An internal reporting process should be accessible and efficient if it is to enable the military 
to take subsequent action to put an end to, prevent, or remedy possible violations of the law. 
Such a process can, however, also serve to enhance operational effectiveness by maintaining 
the discipline required of all members of the military in following the rules, a feature 
inherent to the proper functioning of any armed force. Military or other appropriate 
regulations should thus include provisions that explain the process by which persons other 
than commanders can report incidents which they believe indicate a violation of 
international humanitarian law. 
  
93. Given the structural particularities of the military, internal reporting procedures will not be 
effective unless protection is provided for those submitting a report (except for cases of bad 
faith). This can include ensuring that persons reporting incidents will not be discharged, 
disciplined, downgraded in rank, or subjected to other measures of reprisal or punishment 
as a consequence of reporting. Internal reports may need to be vetted for credibility, but such 
verification should protect the person who reported, particularly from the undue actions of 
their immediate superior. 
 
94. As mentioned, internal reports will usually be expected to be made through the chain of 
command. In certain circumstances an individual may not wish to report to their direct 
commander (e.g., because the latter was implicated in the incident) or is barred from 
reporting directly higher up the chain, i.e. to their commander’s commander. Guidance on 
reporting in such cases should be specified in the relevant military regulations. In these 
scenarios, one possibility would be to enable “lateral” reporting to another commander who 
is at the same level as the immediate superior of the person reporting (e.g., to the commander 
of another company within the same battalion), in order to ensure that all incidents are 
brought to appropriate attention. 
 
95. Some States enable individuals to report directly to law enforcement agencies that deal with 
military law enforcement issues, such as the military or civilian police.  
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GUIDELINE 5: RECEIPT OF EXTERNAL ALLEGATIONS  
 
Accessible and effective processes for receiving external allegations of an incident should be 
provided for. 
COMMENTARY: 
 
96. Accessible and effective processes for receiving external allegations related to an incident 
should be provided for by the military and/or by the appropriate State authorities. 
Allegations extraneous to the military may constitute valuable sources of information: for 
example, they may bring to attention facts that may not have been observed by the military, 
shed light on facts additional to those already observed, or permit an understanding of the 
full scope of the consequences of military action. In some cases, an external allegation may 
be the only source of information that an incident has occurred. 
 
97. How the military or other State authorities receive external allegations will vary depending 
on factors such as the context, location, and type of armed conflict. Information should be 
made available to the general public regarding the existence of the relevant 
processes/mechanisms, how to access them, who receives the allegation(s), and how to 
follow up on an allegation. 
 
98. Allegations related to an incident can be made by persons affected by military operations 
directly or indirectly, and also by other persons or bodies – domestic or international – with 
an interest in the matter. Procedures and channels of communication that ensure the safety, 
security, and privacy of complainants should be established. Challenges such as language 
barriers, and other social and cultural factors that may affect the ability of individuals or 
bodies to bring an allegation should be anticipated, with possible solutions provided. The 
sharing of good practices between units, services, and militaries is valuable in this regard. 
 
99. All allegations should be taken seriously, with no hierarchy between the different sources. 
The prioritisation of allegations may, however, be necessary: some will require more 
meticulous attention, particularly those indicating that war crimes have been committed 
(e.g., intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, pillage, torture of 
detainees, hostage-taking). A large number of allegations related to the same incident or the 
repetition of allegations indicating a pattern of similar incidents should raise particular 
concern about systemic issues or policy-related violations. 
 
100. Whenever feasible, the military should seek to proactively engage with a range of actors 
including other militaries (particularly in multi-national military operations), UN bodies, 
international monitors, NGOs and other civil society organisations, as well as the media 
regarding information arising from allegations. Providing for points of contact or 
intermediaries with such actors is good practice. Direct engagement with the ICRC is of 
particular importance given the organisation’s specific mandate and operational experience 
in situations of armed conflict.54 
 
 
 
                                                                   
54 See Khairullin, E., “5 things that make ICRC confidential information unsuitable for legal proceedings”, 
ICRC Humanitarian Law & Policy (31 January 2019), available at https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2019/01/31/5-things-make-icrc-confidential-information-unsuitable-legal-proceedings/. 
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GUIDELINE 6: ASSESSMENT 
 
Internal reports or externally received allegations related to an incident should be passed on 
to the appropriate authority for an assessment of the action to be taken in response. The 
appropriate authority should be competent to launch a criminal and/or administrative 
investigation, to determine that no investigative action is necessary, or to establish that more 
facts are needed prior to a decision. 
COMMENTARY: 
 
101. Legislation or military regulations should describe to whom and which sort of internal 
report and/or external allegation related to an incident should be transmitted for 
assessment. In some domestic systems there will be more than one authority to which such 
reports and/or allegations must be passed on to for assessment. 
 
102. The degree of independence and impartiality of an assessment authority should as a general 
rule correspond to the gravity of the incident being assessed. As already mentioned, many 
States have clarified that there are certain types of incidents, or incidents of a certain severity 
that must be reported by a commander for assessment higher up. Such an assessment will 
be made by the commander’s superior, or other assessment authority that may be designated 
under domestic law or regulations. In some systems reports/allegations of incidents 
indicating that a crime has been committed must be passed on by the commander to law 
enforcement agencies, either military or civilian. 
 
103. The assessment authority should not have been implicated in the incident. If a commander 
was implicated in an incident (i.e. if they were involved in it or if actions taken by the 
commander related to the incident could cast doubt on their independence and 
impartiality), legislation or military regulations should at a minimum provide that the 
internal report or external allegation is to be referred by the commander to another 
authority for assessment.  
 
104. The person or body making an assessment decision should be able to determine whether it 
is competent to conduct the assessment and be able to carry out a credibility check of the 
internal report or external allegation if necessary.55 
 
105. The assessment authority must under domestic law be competent to launch a criminal 
and/or an administrative investigation as may be required and to examine whether the 
incident at hand may give rise to systemic issues or policy-related violations. A person or 
body tasked with an assessment may also decide that further facts are needed in order to 
make a decision,56 or that no investigative action is warranted.  
 
106. An assessment which, properly carried out, finds there is no need to investigate will 
discharge a State’s obligations related to the repression and suppression of violations of 
international humanitarian law. Legislation and military regulations should however 
provide that a further assessment will take place if new information (reports or allegations) 
related to an incident is received. 
 
107. It is good practice to pass on the results of assessment decisions to authorities that may be 
tasked with monitoring for systemic issues or policy-related violations (see Guidelines 13 
and 15 below). 
                                                                   
55 For the latter see paras 114 and 115 below. 
56 See paras 116 and 117 below.  
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108. In situations of armed conflict, in particular during ongoing hostilities, there may be a need 
to prioritise which incidents to deal with most promptly at the assessment stage. This 
decision will be context-specific, but the gravity of the incident, the need to react quickly, 
and the likelihood of repetition should be considered. It should be noted that international 
humanitarian law provides for clear obligations to deal with incidents involving the death 
or serious injury of detainees.57 
 
109. Legal training or legal support must be provided to a person or body making assessment 
decisions arising from internally reported incidents or external allegations as it will be 
necessary to be able to identify possible violations of international humanitarian law (see 
Guideline 16). 
 
110. It is important that military or civilian law enforcement agencies, where they exist,58 to 
which an internal report or external allegation is passed on are able to independently 
recommend or refer to the appropriate authority (or independently initiate as the case may 
be under domestic law), criminal and/or administrative investigations. 
 
111. The assessment authority must open a criminal investigation if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that a war crime has been committed (see para 119 and Guideline 7). Some 
States may have a lower threshold for opening a criminal investigation for various policy or 
operational reasons.59 As already mentioned, States may for similar reasons criminalise 
under domestic law violations of international humanitarian law that are not provided for 
as war crimes under its rules.60 There may also be other applicable bodies of international 
law relevant to determining whether a criminal investigation is required (in particular 
international human rights law). While the triggers for a criminal investigation in such 
cases are not dealt with in these Guidelines, it should be noted that an assessment decision 
will need to take into account the totality of the applicable legal framework. This should 
include examining any issues of State responsibility that may arise (see Guideline 14). 
 
112. The assessment authority should open an administrative investigation (see Guidelines 12 
and 13) if the circumstances of an incident suggest that a violation of international 
humanitarian law has been committed which does not require a criminal investigation. 
Even if a violation is not apparent, exceptional or unexpected events may also require an 
administrative investigation.61 Administrative investigations can also be triggered for a 
variety of non-legal reasons such as operational needs, lessons-learned exercises, or 
performance improvement which are not addressed in these Guidelines. If the assessment 
authority notices that certain types of reports or allegations are repeated over a period of 
time, it should be able to recommend or open an administrative investigation into possible 
systemic issues or policy-related violations. 
 
113. The involvement of an assessment authority should be prompt as this is crucial to ensuring 
that an incident is given the appropriate investigative response. Certain actions following 
incidents (e.g., reusing the weapons discharged in an incident again shortly after it 
                                                                   
57 GCIII (above note 6) Articles 120-121; GCIV (above note 6) Article 131; ICRC, “Guidelines for Investigating 
Deaths in Custody” (2013). See also other bodies of law, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) UNTS 1465, Article 6; International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006) Article 12.  
58 See paras 126-129 below. 
59 See note 64 below.  
60 See para 57 above.  
61 See definition of incident in para 47 above. 
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happened, failing to restrict access to the scene following the death of a detainee), may delay 
or hinder criminal investigations by modifying or removing evidence so that it cannot be 
used in criminal proceedings due to domestic rules of evidence and procedure. It is thus 
essential that a decision on whether to launch a criminal investigation be made promptly. 
 
114. External allegations may need to be vetted for credibility. As mentioned, such allegations 
may be received in different ways and come from various sources. Establishing the 
credibility of an allegation is essential to determining whether the information contained 
requires further attention, i.e. should be transmitted to the investigative process. Various 
factors can be taken into account in assessing the credibility of external allegations (e.g., the 
source of the allegation, the level of detail on the incident provided, corroboration with 
other sources), and will be context-dependent. Military regulations should provide clear 
guidance on the process and criteria for vetting external allegations.  
 
115. It is important to note that determining the credibility of an external allegation is not the 
same as determining whether there are “reasonable grounds” to believe a criminal offence 
has been committed. While the latter standard is used to trigger a criminal investigation, the 
former constitutes a much lower threshold. It is not necessary to demonstrate that an 
incident involving possible violations of the law actually occurred, only that the allegation 
itself is deemed credible. 
 
116. If further facts are needed in order to make an assessment, the assessment authority should 
carry out – or delegate the responsibility62 for – appropriate action to establish the additional 
facts. Gathering further facts for assessment purposes is a different process to administrative 
investigations. The former procedure is used only for gathering initial information 
sufficient for an assessment decision, and might not, for example, require the formal 
interrogation of witnesses. 
 
117. In all cases a fact-finding exercise must at the very least not delay or hinder future criminal 
proceedings, particularly as regards the handling of potential evidence and the gathering of 
victim or witness statements. 
 
118. It should be noted that in some cases of violations of international humanitarian law an 
assessment may not be necessary. Certain circumstances may be so obvious that it is possible 
to take follow-up action immediately.63  
                                                                   
62 In some domestic systems, the assessment authority will include a preliminary investigative body, such 
as the military or civilian police, for this purpose. 
63 For example, if a commander sees a member of the armed forces inappropriately displaying a Red Cross or 
Red Crescent emblem, but removes the emblem and corrects the soldier before any other consequences arise 
from the act (except if the act constitutes attempted perfidy which would be a war crime). Where such 
behaviour by a soldier is the result of inadequate training, a systemic issue may be involved and need to be 
addressed. See Guideline 13 below.  
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II CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
 
119. A criminal investigation must be opened if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a 
war crime has been committed.64 The purpose of a criminal investigation is to determine the 
facts surrounding an incident so as to enable the establishment of possible individual 
criminal responsibility for conduct prohibited by law and of the criminal sanction(s) that 
may be required. The rights of suspects, victims, and witnesses must be guaranteed from the 
onset of a criminal investigation. 
 
120. Guidelines 7 to 10 deal with the principles of an effective investigation and how they apply 
to a criminal investigation in armed conflict. 
 
121. Guideline 11 deals with the fair trial guarantees which must be respected throughout a 
criminal investigation. 
 
GUIDELINE 7: INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 
 
An independent and impartial investigative authority must be available to carry out 
criminal investigations if there are reasonable grounds to believe that an individual has 
committed a war crime.  
COMMENTARY: 
 
122. A criminal investigation must be independent and impartial. The way in which these 
principles are specifically implemented in a domestic legal system will vary, and may differ 
depending on the authority carrying out an investigation, as described in paragraphs 126 
and 127 below. 
 
123. In terms of independence, an investigative authority must be able to conduct an 
investigation without interference or influence by authorities other than those performing 
an investigative or judicial function, and without fear of reprisal or expectation of favour for 
any finding, recommendation, or decision made.  
 
124. In terms of impartiality, an investigative authority must not have a personal bias or a 
conflict of interest in relation to the case at hand.  
 
125. In light of the principles of independence and impartiality, the investigative authority must 
not have been implicated in the incident and must take themselves out of the proceedings 
where this is the case. The relevant legislation or military regulations should provide so. 
 
126. In some domestic systems, all investigations, including criminal ones, are within the 
purview of the commander. In some such cases, law, policy, or military regulations 
nevertheless define certain exceptions/caveats to the commander’s authority to conduct a 
criminal investigation. It is, for example, foreseen that crimes of a certain level of severity 
must be investigated by an authority up or outside the chain of command. It is likewise 
provided that particular categories of crimes (e.g., acts of sexual violence), must be 
investigated by an authority outside the chain of command (e.g., a military or civilian law 
enforcement agency) regardless of their severity.  
                                                                   
64 See para 111 above. Domestically, States use different standards for triggering a criminal investigation, for 
example “reasonable belief”, “reasonable suspicion”, “credible information”, “sufficient grounds for 
suspicion”. 
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127. In yet other domestic systems all criminal offences are outside the remit of the commander 
so as to ensure that criminal investigations are structurally and practically independent and 
impartial and are seen as such. In these systems, the investigation of possible criminal acts 
must always be passed on to a body outside the chain of command, such as a military or 
civilian law enforcement agency. 
 
128. It is submitted that States must have a law enforcement agency outside the chain of 
command (e.g., the military or civilian police), that conducts investigations into suspected 
war crimes committed by members of the armed forces in order for criminal investigations 
to be independent and impartial and be seen as such. The relevant agencies will also have 
the expertise necessary to investigate particularly serious or complex cases, including 
incidents in which the chain of command is suspected to have been involved. 
 
129. Structural guarantees contributing to the independence and impartiality of a military law 
enforcement agency65 will include the way in which its members are appointed, their tenure 
and rank, and the relevant reporting structure. Safeguards and checks against command 
influence should also be foreseen.  
 
130. Persons, agencies, or other bodies tasked with criminal investigations should be adequately 
trained, equipped, and funded. They should, inter alia, be able to collect and securely store 
evidence (with due attention paid to data protection and privacy concerns, and 
implementing chain of custody standards), have access to and be able to interview suspects, 
victims, and witnesses, be supplied with forensic equipment, and be skilled in investigative 
techniques. They should have the relevant operational expertise, as well as the necessary 
operational information related to the incident. Investigators should be familiar with the 
applicable legal framework or be able to rely on legal advisors. 
 
131. Special expertise related to specific vulnerabilities in armed conflict should be ensured, such 
as for cases of alleged sexual violence, torture, or incidents in which children may have been 
victims, witnesses, or suspects. 
 
132. Providing adequate interpretation for persons conducting an investigation is essential, and 
competent interpreters should be available whenever needed (see Guideline 8). 
 
133. Some States have different investigative arrangements in place depending on whether the 
military is acting in its own territory or abroad, for example as part of a multi-national 
coalition, or under UN or regional organisation auspices. Whether a criminal offence is 
committed in or outside a State’s territory may affect the capacity of an investigative 
authority (other than a commander) to act, or act promptly, where, for example, such 
authority is not deployed alongside the armed forces. It may also raise questions as to the 
appropriate jurisdiction to investigate. These and other similar issues that would arise in 
extraterritorial operations should be considered prior to an armed conflict or deployment to 
ensure that investigations can be adequately conducted, in order to preclude impunity and 
safeguard the rights of suspects, victims, and witnesses. 
 
134. As already noted above, a war crime may give rise to both individual criminal responsibility 
and to State responsibility. The investigative authority in criminal proceedings should, with 
the necessary legal advice, be able to pass information on to and/or be able to initiate action 
before an appropriate authority that could separately examine and address the possible State 
                                                                   
65 This paragraph deals with military law enforcement agencies given the focus of the Guidelines, but 
guarantees of independence and impartiality will of course equally apply to civilian law enforcement bodies. 
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responsibility issues that may arise (see Guideline 14). This should take place regardless of 
whether the criminal proceedings may have been discontinued. 
 
GUIDELINE 8: THOROUGHNESS 
 
Investigations must be thorough. All feasible steps must be taken to collect, analyse, 
preserve, and store evidence. Action that cannot be undertaken must be documented and 
justified. 
COMMENTARY: 
 
135. Thoroughness refers to the means of carrying out a criminal investigation in order to 
achieve the intended purpose of uncovering the facts. It relates, more specifically, to the 
practical and/or procedural steps that will be necessary to ensure that the facts can be 
adequately elucidated. These will include the collection, analysis, preservation, and storing 
of material and documentary evidence, identifying and interviewing victims and witnesses 
and members of the armed forces who may have been involved in the incident, and 
documenting and storing the respective testimonies. Conducting autopsies and 
undertaking other forensic examinations may also be necessary. Evidence may likewise 
need to be appropriately transported. 
 
136. In this context it should be recalled that criminal investigations will require the fulfilment 
of standards of evidence for a criminal trial, the exact modalities of which will be provided 
for in domestic law. While flexibility may be necessary, attention must be paid to ensure 
that the evidence collected will be admissible in possible criminal proceedings. Evidence 
gathered in a way that does not respect the rights of suspects, victims, and witnesses may be 
of limited use or even prove detrimental to such proceedings. 
 
137. Whether a criminal investigation may be deemed thorough will depend on whether all 
feasible steps were undertaken to establish the facts in the circumstances at hand. The 
degree of thoroughness expected in investigating an incident that, for example, took place 
at a checkpoint in a rear area, or in a detention facility, or after hostilities have subsided, will 
be different to that required from an investigation occurring in an active combat zone. 
 
138. Challenges related to the thoroughness of an investigation in armed conflict may include: 
accessing, preserving and transporting evidence; accessing victims and witnesses and 
carrying out interviews;66 cultural and human rights considerations (e.g., as regards autopsy, 
burial, exhumation); ongoing hostilities and the lack of safety of investigative personnel. 
The location and pace of military operations may also be relevant, for example where 
territorial control is lost over an area entailing lack of personnel on the ground. While these 
and other obstacles to the thoroughness of an investigation may arise, all circumstances 
should be taken into account when deciding on the feasibility of an action, and alternative 
action should be sought. 
  
139. Certain challenges should be anticipated and can be overcome by means of preparation, 
including by planning and training prior to armed conflict or deployment. Specific ways of 
adapting investigative steps to armed conflict conditions, where resources permit, include 
the use of technology, for example scanners for autopsies in cases of cultural concerns, the 
                                                                   
66 It should be recalled that victims and witnesses may in a given situation also be accessed and interviewed 
outside the site of an incident, e.g., internally displaced persons or members of one’s own armed forces who 
have returned home. 
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use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to access dangerous scenes and collect video 
evidence, the use of video recording equipment during operations, and involving the local 
population/government in the investigative process when possible. Where there is no 
ground control it is still possible to use recorded operational planning to review the decision-
making process, and available technology can be used to assess mission effects from the air. 
Technology and digital communication can also be used to overcome certain difficulties 
associated with distance and security problems, for example to enable the participation of 
victims or witnesses remotely. 
 
140. There may be a need to make prioritisation decisions at the investigative stage regarding 
which evidence can most feasibly be collected and which is likely to be most useful for a 
possible prosecution. The key purpose in such decisions should be to establish whether an 
incident included criminal behaviour so as to enable the effective repression of such 
behaviour. Allocation of resources to investigations should be made in an adequate and 
reasonable manner within the overall context.67 
 
141. Investigative steps should be documented. This should include what actions have been 
taken, what actions were attempted, and what actions were not able to be taken and why. 
Documentation serves, inter alia, to demonstrate the thoroughness of an investigation 
should queries and challenges later arise. 
 
142. The investigation of certain criminal acts has received detailed attention at the international 
level under both international humanitarian law and international human rights law. UN 
and independent human rights bodies or processes have developed best practice guidance 
for, inter alia, extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions,68 torture,69 deaths in custody,70 
sexual violence,71 and enforced disappearances.72 Some of these documents have not been 
drawn up specifically for situations of armed conflict, but provide useful guidance on how 
to conduct thorough investigations in case of the respective violations. 
 
  
                                                                   
67 ICC: The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on Appeals (8 June 2018), No. ICC-01/05-01/08 A, 
paras 169-170; ICTY: Prosecutor v Boškoski and Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber Judgment (10 July 2008), IT-04-82-
T, para 415; Prosecutor v Orić, Appeals Chamber (3 July 2008), IT-03-68-A, para 177; Prosecutor v Halilović, 
Appeals Chamber (16 October 2007), IT-01-48-A, para 63. 
68 UN OHCHR, Revision of the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, 
Arbitrary and Summary Executions (“Minnesota Protocol”). 
69 UN OHCHR, Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Istanbul Protocol”) (2004), HR/P/PT/8/Rev.1. 
70 ICRC, “Guidelines for Investigating Deaths in Custody” (2013). 
71 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation 
of Sexual Violence in Conflict” (2nd ed, March 2017). 
72 International Commission of Jurists, “Enforced Disappearance and Extrajudicial Execution: Investigation 
and Sanction” (2015) – this is a practitioner’s guide rather than an investigation manual but contains some 
elements about the particularity of investigating offences of this type.  
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GUIDELINE 9: PROMPTNESS 
 
A criminal investigation must be opened promptly after an assessment determines that 
reasonable grounds exist to believe a war crime has been committed. The investigative 
process must be carried out without unreasonable delay. 
COMMENTARY: 
 
143. A criminal investigation must be promptly opened because the collection of evidence is 
often only possible very soon after an incident. The effects of the passage of time are well 
known: a crime scene will change, evidence may disappear, memories fade, witnesses can be 
threatened, suspects may collude. A lack of promptness in the launching of an investigation 
can thus affect the rights of suspects, victims, and witnesses. Sufficient planning, resources, 
personnel, and training are essential to ensure the promptness of any criminal investigation 
given the challenges that may be posed by battlefield conditions. As already mentioned, the 
on-scene commander may have a key role to play in securing certain types of information 
and evidence (see Guideline 2). 
 
144. Once an investigation has been initiated, the necessary subsequent action must be taken 
without unreasonable delay. The fulfilment of this standard is not to be equated with the 
speediness of the results, but means that there must be sustained investigative activity and 
proper justification for delay when that is not the case. (For example, the effectiveness of an 
investigation requires that sufficient care is taken in the investigative steps, and certain 
steps such as forensic testing, may require time.) Here too, consistently documenting 
investigative steps will be necessary in order to demonstrate that an investigation was 
carried out without undue delay should queries and challenges later arise. 
 
145. It should be recalled that there are no time limitations in respect of bringing the perpetrators 
of war crimes to justice under international law,73 which means that a criminal investigation 
may be opened long after the events at issue. Such an investigation is likely to face particular 
obstacles as regards the collection of information and evidence which, in turn, can affect the 
due process rights of suspects, as well as of victims and witnesses. The proper 
documentation of investigative steps is thus crucial. In cases where investigations and 
prosecutions are initiated in respect of war crimes that happened long ago, effectiveness may 
require that their mandate and scope be carefully determined. 
 
GUIDELINE 10: TRANSPARENCY 
 
A criminal investigation should be as transparent as possible taking into account the 
circumstances. 
COMMENTARY: 
 
146. Transparency may be described as the need for openness, communication and 
accountability in the investigative process. It should, however, be acknowledged that the 
international discussion about the transparency of criminal investigations in armed conflict 
is evolving.  
                                                                   
73 UN GA, Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession 26 November 1968, A/RES/2391; 
Council of Europe, European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes 
against Humanity and War Crimes, 25 January 1974, ETS No. 082; ICC Statute (above note 7) Article 29; ICRC 
Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rule 160. 
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147. Two aspects of transparency in criminal investigations may generally be identified: 
providing information to victims and their next of kin regarding ongoing criminal 
investigative processes, and providing information on such processes to the general public 
for overall accountability purposes. The general public will include international and 
domestic organisations and bodies, civil society, the media, and others. 
 
148. The investigative authority should whenever possible, taking into account the 
circumstances, communicate with the victims of an incident and their next of kin, and 
or/lawyers where engaged. This can include: confirming receipt of an externally submitted 
allegation; communicating a decision to open an investigation or not, with 
acknowledgment in the former case that the investigation may take time for a specified 
reason; explaining whether an investigation is ongoing; informing about an investigation’s 
findings (including its factual and legal basis); explaining a decision to criminally prosecute 
or not. Communication should be prompt, as this can help mitigate concerns of inaction. 
Providing liaison officers to communicate with victims and their next of kin is good practice. 
 
149. It should be recalled that under international humanitarian law the parties to an armed 
conflict have specific obligations related to persons missing or dead due to the armed 
conflict, including to provide family members with any information on the fate and 
whereabouts of their relatives.74 
 
150. Information on what procedures are in place for carrying out criminal investigations should 
be available to the general public.75 Communicating the outcome of an investigation is good 
practice,76 as it will demonstrate that international humanitarian law is being applied and is 
seen to be applied. It can also help maintain or improve relations with the civilian 
population. 
 
151. Where third parties, such as international or domestic organisations and bodies, NGOs, civil 
society organisations, and others have made external allegations about an incident, it is 
likewise good practice for the military to provide for appropriate channels and modes of 
communication. Third parties should be able to access the channels for submitting 
allegations, know that their allegation has been received, and be informed about whether 
action is being taken, including, where feasible, the reasons for any decision in this regard.77  
 
152. Transparency in a criminal investigation is in practice limited by domestic law and/or policy 
for various reasons, including to guarantee the rights of suspects, victims, and witnesses, to 
safeguard other ongoing investigations, or for national security reasons. It should be noted 
that information classified in the investigative stage may be released in the trial stage. 
 
153. There is a risk of over-classification of information in armed conflict, including on national 
security grounds. Over-classification may hinder investigations if the competent 
investigative authorities are not able to access the information necessary to carry out an 
                                                                   
74 API (above note 6) Articles 32 and 33; ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rules 116 and 117 and 
commentary. 
75 There are a range of practical ways to facilitate transparency of information about criminal investigations. 
Communication can take place for example by means of websites, electronic reading rooms (with various 
levels of access if necessary), reading rooms for on-site only access to documents by members of the media. 
Any redaction of documents should not render them incomprehensible.  
76 The outcome of a trial must be publicly communicated (except in cases specified under international law). 
77 Possible language barriers should be taken into account so as to enable the accessibility of information. 
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effective investigation,78 and may also come into conflict with the need for transparency 
related to criminal investigations as discussed above. It is good practice to have an 
appropriate process to enable review of classification decisions, including when challenges 
to classification are made in criminal proceedings. The review process should allow for 
independent assessment of the national security concerns so that scrutiny into violations of 
international humanitarian law is not precluded. 
 
GUIDELINE 11: FAIR TRIAL GUARANTEES 
 
The fair trial guarantees of a suspect must be respected in an investigation as in all other 
stages of criminal proceedings. 
COMMENTARY: 
 
154. The fair trial rights of a suspect must be respected in all stages of any criminal proceedings, 
from the moment an investigation commences until the rendering of a final judgment on 
appeal. The right to a fair trial is a fundamental guarantee of international humanitarian 
law,79 and is also protected under human rights law.80 Having in mind the abundance of 
international jurisprudence and other sources of information on its various elements, only 
a few salient reminders are made below. 
 
155. Some rights are applicable in the investigative stage of criminal proceedings, which is part 
of the pre-trial process.81 This includes safeguarding the way in which evidence (including 
victim and witness statements) is collected, and ensuring the requisite independence and 
impartiality in the choice and actions of an investigative authority as described above (see 
Guideline 7). The way in which these rights are elaborated will differ depending on the 
domestic legal system but, as already noted, a failure to safeguard may hinder or prevent an 
outcome in further stages of the criminal proceedings. 
 
156. Other fair trial rights applicable to the investigative stage guaranteed by international law 
non-exhaustively include the presumption of innocence, the right of a suspect to 
information about the nature and cause of the charge against them, the right to legal 
counsel, to be tried without undue delay, the right to an interpreter where necessary, and 
the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt.82 
                                                                   
78 In this way classification of information can also impact the thoroughness of an investigation, for example 
if investigators are not able to access the information required to determine the facts of an incident, 
including who may have been involved. 
79 Fair trial rights are provided for in GCIII (above note 6) Articles 99, 102, 105 and 106 for prisoners of war, 
and GCIV (above note 6) Articles 5, 66 and 71 for civilians. A list of fair trial rights is set forth in API (above 
note 6) Article 75(4) for international armed conflict. Fair trial rights are guaranteed by common Article 3 to 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (above note 6) in non-international armed conflicts and a list is 
included in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter “APII”] (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 
609, Article 6. See also ICCPR (above note 15) Article 14. 
80 Some human rights treaties permit derogation from fair trial guarantees under specific circumstances, but 
certain fundamental principles of fair trial rights must be respected at all times. See e.g., UN Human Rights 
Committee, “General Comment No. 32 Article 14, Right to Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair 
Trial” (23 August 2007) CCPR/C/GC/32, para 6. 
81 UN OHCHR, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, 
Prosecutors and Lawyers, “Chapter 6: The Right to a Fair Trial: Part I – From Investigation to Trial” (2003). 
82 See e.g., API (above note 6), Article 75(4), and APII (above note 79) Article 6, which are widely considered 
to reflect customary law in international and non-international armed conflicts, respectively, and ICCPR 
(above note 15) Article 14. 
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157. Whether and how victims can participate in a criminal investigation will depend on 
domestic law (e.g., common and civil law systems tend to differ in this regard) and applicable 
international law. In some systems, victims or next of kin may be a party to criminal 
proceedings, in others they may participate as witnesses. The involvement of victims or 
their next of kin may be particularly delicate in armed conflict settings due to possibly 
difficult relations between a State and the civilian population, security concerns, and other 
factors. Technology and digital communication can, however, be relied on to overcome 
certain challenges associated with distance and security issues to enable the participation of 
victims or next of kin remotely, for example by video link. 
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III ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS 
 
158. For the purpose of these Guidelines, administrative investigations encompass all forms of 
investigations that are not criminal in nature. They are one way in which States can fulfil 
their obligation to suppress violations of international humanitarian law.83 This type of 
proceeding can be conducted prior to, in parallel with, or following a criminal investigation, 
in order to, for example, address issues linked to an incident that are not of a criminal, but of 
an operational, policy, or disciplinary character. The exact interplay will depend on the 
domestic legal system, but administrative investigations should never hinder criminal 
investigations. 
 
159. The two categories of administrative investigations broadly distinguished in this text are: 
 
1. Investigations into individual conduct in order to, inter alia, establish possible non-
criminal responsibility arising from an incident, and whether State responsibility 
may have been engaged; 
 
2. Investigations aimed at identifying systemic issues that may have caused or 
contributed to an incident, and whether State responsibility may have been 
engaged. 
 
160. Guideline 12 deals with administrative investigations into the acts of individuals and the 
way in which these investigations should be carried out. 
 
161. Guideline 13 deals with administrative investigations into systemic issues, and how such 
issues can be detected and investigated. 
 
162. Administrative investigations must be “effective” insofar as they should be capable of 
enabling a determination of whether there was a non-criminal violation of international 
humanitarian law, of identifying the individual and systemic factors that caused or 
contributed to the incident, and of laying the ground for any remedial action that may be 
required. The principles of an “effective” investigation commonly associated with criminal 
investigations (independence, impartiality, thoroughness, promptness and transparency) 
are thus also relevant to administrative investigations. Their application will depend on the 
specific context, taking also into account that administrative investigations are often carried 
out by the commander and/or within the military itself. However, the severity of an incident 
should be an important criterion: the more serious it is, the greater the expectation that the 
application of the principles will resemble that of a criminal investigation.  
 
GUIDELINE 12: ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS INTO ACTS OF INDIVIDUALS 
 
An administrative investigation should be carried out if the circumstances of an incident 
suggest that an individual may have committed – through act or omission – a non-criminal 
violation of international humanitarian law.  
COMMENTARY: 
 
163. An administrative investigation should be carried out if the circumstances of an incident 
suggest that a non-criminal violation of international humanitarian law has been 
committed through the act or omission of an individual. This type of investigation should, 
                                                                   
83 See paras 13-16 above. 
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for example, occur if there is doubt about what happened in the course of a military 
operation (did a commander fail to provide adequate warning?), the reasons for the extent of 
damage to civilian objects caused (did an individual forget to communicate a “no-strike” 
list?), whether or not military regulations were respected (why did a member of a guard force 
turn away relatives coming to visit a detainee in a detention facility?), or whether an 
incident was due to military personnel action (were riots in a detention centre caused by 
guard force behaviour?). 
 
164. Jurisdiction over violations of international humanitarian law other than war crimes is 
usually the exclusive purview of military bodies, and corrective action over a member of the 
military is generally vested in their commander.84  
 
165. A commander or other authority responsible for an administrative investigation should be 
able to sanction those liable, i.e. must be superior in rank and be able to take other measures 
that may be necessary to suppress a violation. They should be in a position to make an 
informed and objective decision on whether individual responsibility exists and have access 
to legal advisors for this purpose if necessary (see Guideline 16). 
 
166. The format of administrative investigations is determined by each State and its military and 
may also be within the discretion of the commander. It can be fairly informal and entail 
what are in some domestic systems called “commander investigations”, “summary 
investigations”, or “disciplinary investigations”, or be more formal and comprise “boards of 
inquiry”, “commissions of inquiry”, or “service inquiries”, carried out at a higher level. 
Administrative investigations can involve interviewing members of a military unit, 
designating an individual to gather the facts (inter alia the recorded information) 
surrounding an incident, or require the involvement of a professional investigative team in 
the case of more serious incidents.  
 
167. As already mentioned, if reasonable grounds to believe that a war crime has been committed 
arise in the course of an administrative investigation, the case must be referred to the 
competent authority for criminal investigation. 
 
168. Administrative investigations can also be used to establish facts (including the 
consequences of mistakes) that would not lead to any individual responsibility as such, but 
should be examined in order to avoid repetition of the conduct in question (e.g., why was 
there a disruption of delivery of sufficient blankets to a detention facility?). This type of 
administrative investigation is particularly employed in some domestic systems when it is 
deemed more important to preclude the reoccurrence of a practice or behaviour than to 
possibly identify and take appropriate action against those involved. 
 
169. The degree of independence and impartiality85 of an investigative authority should as a 
general rule correspond to the gravity of the incident being assessed. Where serious 
incidents are at issue – including, for example, the death or serious injury of a civilian or 
civilian property damage – which nonetheless do not raise reasonable grounds to believe 
that a war crime has been committed, the investigative authority should be up or outside 
the chain of command to ensure the necessary independence and impartiality and a 
perception thereof. 
 
                                                                   
84 Pictet Commentary to GCIV (above note 21) Article 146, p. 594; ICRC Commentary to API (above note 46) 
Article 87, paras 3560-3563.  
85 See paras 123-125 above. 
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170. The investigative authority should not have been implicated in the incident. The 
commander of a unit involved in an incident may in some systems nevertheless be tasked 
(e.g., by the assessment authority or an investigative authority higher up) to undertake 
certain investigative steps, such as collecting more information or evidence on an incident 
and reporting back on their findings. In such a case, the commander should not be tasked 
with the legal assessment of the facts, i.e. determining whether there was a violation of 
international humanitarian law. 
 
171. Adequate resources should be provided to the authority responsible for an administrative 
investigation. This includes training prior to armed conflict or deployment, as well as such 
support as may be needed for investigations in ongoing operations (e.g., access to the site if 
necessary, to victims, and witnesses, or alleged perpetrators). The investigative authority 
should possess sufficient operational knowledge to understand the context.  
 
172. Action taken in administrative investigations should be prompt. In some circumstances 
there may be a need to prioritise which incidents to deal with first. Relevant considerations 
will include the seriousness of the incident, the urgent need to ensure the cessation of a 
violation, to take immediate disciplinary action, to take remedial action for those affected 
by an incident, and to implement changes so as to avoid the repetition of similar acts or 
omissions. 
 
173. Actions that could not be taken by the investigative authority due to lack of resources, 
security, or other reasons linked to military operations should be justified and recorded. This 
will enable the military to assess whether an incident has been adequately dealt with. It may 
also prove crucial if internal reports or external allegations later arise concerning an 
incident, or criminal proceedings are subsequently triggered. 
 
174. Information about the structure and methodology of administrative investigations, for 
example on the military’s disciplinary policy or on the way in which administrative 
investigations are generally conducted, should be publicly available. It is good practice to 
make information publicly available about the content and course of specific administrative 
investigations as well: of the steps that were taken, of the decisions made, and of the remedial 
action initiated, as a way of demonstrating compliance with international humanitarian 
law. Particular regard should be paid to the interests of victims and next of kin who may 
have submitted allegations on an incident. 
 
175. It should be expected that administrative investigations related to individual acts will 
generate questions related to State responsibility when an incident was of a serious nature. 
The competent authority should, with the necessary legal advice, be able to pass information 
on to and/or be to able initiate action before an appropriate authority that could separately 
examine and address the possible State responsibility issues that may arise (see Guideline 
14).86 This should take place in addition to whatever corrective measures may be taken with 
respect to an individual. 
 
  
                                                                   
86 Follow-up could include providing a declaration as to the finding of a violation, and financial 
compensation if persons or property were harmed as a result of the violation. 
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GUIDELINE 13: ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS INTO SYSTEMIC ISSUES  
 
An administrative investigation into systemic issues should be carried out if the 
circumstances of an incident suggest that underlying causes are likely to have led to an 
incident or could lead to further incidents.  
COMMENTARY: 
 
176. A systemic problem can arise at many different levels and in different contexts. Examples of 
systemic issues that could cause or contribute to an incident include inadequate training 
within a unit,87 the application of inappropriate rules of engagement in a military 
operation,88 or an inherent weapon malfunction across the whole military.89 An 
investigation into a systemic issue may be undertaken as part of an already ongoing 
administrative investigation of an individual for an incident or be stand-alone. 
 
177. Identifying and addressing systemic issues is important to ensure compliance with 
international humanitarian law, but will also help improve operational effectiveness and 
mission success. An administrative investigation into systemic issues can likewise help 
determine whether a certain policy may be the cause of systemic issues (see Guideline 15). 
 
178. A systemic issue will often be detected through a pattern of problems. It is more likely to be 
detected if investigators are instructed to seek to understand whether a certain type of 
incident has occurred before and to compare it with other recent investigations of a similar 
nature. In more complex cases it may be necessary to collect data from different operations 
and have the capacity to undertake cross-cutting analysis of information in order to detect 
the interrelatedness of problems (e.g., by means of review of relevant operational records, 
incident reports, disciplinary proceedings, or investigative results).  
 
179. Systemic issues can also be detected following a single incident where there is reason to 
believe that the cause of the incident is likely to lead to further incidents. In some situations, 
systemic issues may even be detected before any incidents arise: they can be identified 
through simple operational observation and due diligence (e.g., noticing that 
accommodation provided to detainees is inadequate for the climate).  
 
180. The competent authority will depend on the nature of the problem and the necessary skills 
may differ from those required for other types of investigations, for example, criminal. The 
competent authority can range from a ground commander all the way up to a Ministry of 
Defence lessons-learned unit, assisted by the necessary technical experts.  
 
181. The degree of independence and impartiality90 of an investigative authority should as a 
general rule correspond to the gravity of the systemic issue(s) being examined. Systemic 
problems related to the application or interpretation of the law, policy, or military 
regulations that may be causing or contributing to incidents would require review by a high-
level authority – not involved in setting the law, policy, or military regulations – with a 
mandate to initiate changes in the way they are applied or interpreted (see Guideline 15). 
 
                                                                   
87 E.g., The guard force in a place of detention denies detainees the right to practice their religion due to lack 
of adequate training on the treatment of detainees. 
88 E.g., Inadequate rules of engagement for soldiers at checkpoints leading to civilian injuries. 
89 E.g., The malfunction is the result of inadequate quality of weapons due to corruption in the procurement 
system. 
90 See paras 123-125 above. 
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182. In this context it should be mentioned that regular monitoring for possible systemic 
problems – as distinct from administrative investigations – should in practice be 
undertaken. Monitoring should be a part of the everyday command function. It can also be 
assigned to lessons-learned bodies, weapons or material management agencies, appropriate 
inspection bodies, and others. Setting up a dedicated body to track, review reports about, and 
take action in case of systemic problems would be good practice. In reality it may be difficult 
for a State to abide by its obligations in relation to systemic violations without a monitoring 
system. 
 
183. Thorough recording of military operations, as well as its adequate storage and archiving will 
be essential for the purpose of detecting systemic problems (Guideline 1). Reports of 
incidents and assessments should be copied to a dedicated review body, where it exists, in 
parallel to the normal reporting procedure. The effective and efficient storage and archiving 
(manual or electronic) of any prior investigation into an incident will likewise be key to 
identifying systemic issues.  
 
184. Adequate resources need to be provided to those carrying out administrative investigations 
into systemic issues. The expectation to detect and investigate systemic problems should be 
held to what is feasible. Actions that could not be taken due to lack of resources, security, or 
other constraints linked to battlefield conditions should be justified and recorded. This will 
enable the military to assess whether a systemic issue has been adequately identified and 
dealt with, including where internal reports or external allegations arise related to an 
incident. 
 
185. Action taken in administrative investigations into systemic issues should be prompt, having 
in mind the need to prevent possible violations of international humanitarian law or the 
reoccurrence of those that may have been committed. 
 
186. Investigations into systemic issues should be able to identify whether State responsibility 
may be engaged. A systemic issue may have caused a violation, or multiple violations of 
international humanitarian law, with no intent by any person or body to do so. The 
competent authority should, with the necessary legal advice, be able to pass information on 
to and/or be able to initiate action before an appropriate authority that could separately 
examine and address the possible State responsibility issues that may arise (see Guideline 
14).91 This should take place in addition to whatever corrective measures may be taken with 
respect to the systemic issue.  
 
  
                                                                   
91 Follow-up could include financial payments to the victims or their next of kin, publishing the outcome of 
the investigation, issuing an apology, guaranteeing non-repetition. 
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IV GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
GUIDELINE 14: ESTABLISHING STATE RESPONSIBILITY  
 
The responsibility of the State for a violation of international humanitarian law should be 
established separately from the responsibility of an individual. 
COMMENTARY 
 
188. War crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law may give rise to the 
responsibility of the relevant State,92 in addition to individual responsibility. Furthermore, 
the consequences of violations of international humanitarian law are usually such that 
action beyond criminal or administrative proceedings may need to be instituted to, in 
particular, bring about the cessation of certain violations, ensure their non-repetition, and 
provide victims with remedies.  
 
189. It is well-established that a party to an international armed conflict that violates 
international humanitarian law is liable to pay compensation (a form of reparation) if the 
case demands. This obligation has been implemented through various agreements among 
States, usually adopted as part of post-conflict settlements. While nothing in the relevant 
provisions suggests that individual victims cannot also be the direct beneficiaries of 
reparations for violations of international humanitarian law by a State in this type of armed 
conflict, the practice has been uneven. In non-international armed conflicts victims will 
usually have access to domestic courts to seek reparations for violations of IHL.93 
 
190. Domestically, a State’s responsibility may take the form of civil liability for harm committed 
to individuals or entities by the armed forces. The extent to which, and the specific ways in 
which, the civil liability of a State may be established in domestic proceedings (judicial or 
other), and the remedies available, will vary according to the domestic legal system. 
 
191. As mentioned earlier, it may also be necessary to consider matters of State responsibility in 
relation to individuals or other entities harmed by a violation of another branch of 
international law which explicitly provides that they are the direct holders of rights, e.g., 
individuals under international human rights law. 
 
192. Establishing matters of State responsibility can either be part of the investigative process 
(whether criminal or administrative) or carried out in parallel or subsequent to the 
respective investigations by a separate authority, based, for example, in the State’s Ministry 
of Defence. Alternatively or additionally, this authority should also be able to examine and 
make findings related to possible State responsibility on its own motion.  
 
193. In order to cease or prevent the repetition of violations, it may, for example, be necessary to 
carry out organisational changes within the military reporting system, amend the law, 
repeal certain military regulations, or address the behavioural or cultural roots that may 
                                                                   
92 See notes 19 and 20 above. 
93 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) Article 3; API (above note 6) Article 91; ICRC 
Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rules 149 and 150 and commentary. 
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have caused the violation in the first place, for example through modifications in teaching 
or training.94 
 
194. Similarly, respect for the right of victims to an effective remedy may require the 
introduction of appropriate mechanisms or processes by the State. These can include official 
verification of the facts, public disclosure of the truth, an accurate accounting of the 
violations, the search for the disappeared and the bodies of those killed,95 compensation 
(including by establishing compensation funds), and other.96 
 
GUIDELINE 15: POLICY-RELATED VIOLATIONS 
 
Oversight bodies or mechanisms should be provided for and authorised by domestic law to 
take action in case of policy-related violations of international humanitarian law. 
COMMENTARY: 
 
195. Policy-related violations of international humanitarian law can be the result of: 1) an 
explicit or implicit policy to violate international humanitarian law (e.g., related to 
targeting practices or the treatment of detainees) or 2) wilful disregard for ongoing reports, 
allegations and/or information that international humanitarian law is being violated (e.g., 
failure to investigate allegations related to sexual abuse). Policy-related violations can occur 
at different levels, but are more likely to emanate from the highest levels of the military or 
of the executive branch. A policy to commit or tolerate violations can result in multiple 
and/or severe incidents, involving war crimes. 
 
196. As a type of systemic issue, policy-related violations should generate internal reports or 
external allegations. They should also be detected through appropriate investigative 
procedures and their results, and the general monitoring of military operations (see 
Guideline 13 above). 
 
197. A properly constituted and functioning domestic investigative system should be capable of 
effectively investigating policy-related issues. However, where a policy is set at higher levels 
in the military, or depending on the type of violations involved (e.g., against a particular 
ethnic group), the regular investigative system may be unable or unwilling to act. It would 
thus be good practice for a State to, in advance, have in place appropriate oversight bodies or 
mechanisms mandated to react. 
 
198. The oversight bodies or mechanisms can be located within the military (e.g., a specific 
military inspection body with appropriate powers) and/or be outside the military (e.g., 
judicial or parliamentary bodies, commissions of inquiry, or ombudspersons having the 
requisite oversight authority). Such bodies should have the authority to make binding 
decisions on how the matter should proceed, including referral of appropriate cases to 
                                                                   
94 See e.g., measures ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding non-repetition of 
human rights violations: Paniagua-Morales et al v Guatemala, Reparations and Costs (25 May 2001), Ser. C No. 
76, para 203; Juan Humberto Sánchez v Honduras, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs (7 
June 2003), Ser C. No 99, para 189; Vélez Loor v Panama Judgment (23 November 2010), Ser. C No 218, paras 
271-272. 
95 See para 149 above. 
96 See Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation (above note 18) paras 15-23. According to 
these Principles, full and effective reparation to victims of serious violations of international humanitarian 
law includes the following forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of 
non-repetition. The adequate content of these forms of reparation are elaborated within the Principles. 
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criminal or other proceedings, and be able to recommend reforms of the investigative or 
judicial system as may be necessary. The mandate and procedures of the relevant oversight 
bodies or mechanisms should be provided for in domestic legislation. 
 
199. It should be noted that policy-related violations may give rise to the scrutiny or involvement 
of international mechanisms and bodies, including of a judicial nature. This will especially 
be the case where there is a failure to conduct effective investigations into violations of 
international humanitarian law at the domestic level. 
 
GUIDELINE 16: LEGAL ADVISORS 
 
Armed forces are expected to have legal advisors available to assist commanders and/or 
investigative authorities whenever required or necessary. 
COMMENTARY: 
 
200. In international armed conflict, legal advisors must be available when necessary to advise 
military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of international 
humanitarian law and on the appropriate instruction to be given to armed forces on this 
subject. This is a requirement of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions97 to 
which 174 States are party, but is also widely observed by States that are not party to the 
Protocol. In State practice legal advisors can be military or civilian. 
 
201. As demonstrated in these Guidelines, legal advisors can be called on to perform a range of 
other roles in the implementation of international humanitarian law in international 
armed conflict. In addition to support to military operations and training, legal advice will 
be required or necessary in criminal or administrative investigations, and legal advisors may 
provide legal counsel in prosecutions, assess for issues of State responsibility, and have other 
tasks. 
 
202. The military is expected to have legal advisors to carry out the same functions in non-
international armed conflict.98 Compliance with international humanitarian law governing 
this type of conflict is likewise an international legal obligation.99 The armed forces must 
respect the relevant norms and, inter alia, undertake investigations to suppress violations of 
international humanitarian law, or repress war crimes. In fact, the applicable legal 
framework may be more complex than in international armed conflict. Many militaries 
now have legal advisors available in any type of armed conflict in which they may be 
involved, as well as in peacetime. 
 
203. The appropriateness of the involvement of a legal advisor in a specific investigation will 
depend on the context and the role of the legal advice in the incident under investigation. 
                                                                   
97 API (above note 6) Article 82. See also ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rule 141, and 
commentary: “This rule is contained in many military manuals. It is also supported by official statements 
and reported practice. Practice indicates that many States which are not party to Additional Protocol I have 
legal advisers available to their armed forces (...) No official contrary practice was found.”  
98 See ICRC Customary Law Study (above note 6) Rule 141, and commentary: “State practice establishes this 
rule as a norm of customary international law for State armed forces. The practice collected does not indicate 
that any distinction is made between advice on international humanitarian law applicable in international 
armed conflicts and that applicable in non-international armed conflicts.” 
99 Article 1 Common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (above note 6); ICRC Customary Law Study 
(above note 6) Rule 141 with related State practice. See further ICRC Advisory Service on International 
Humanitarian Law, “Legal Advisors in Armed Forces” (2003). 
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The institutional separation of legal roles in a military legal advisory service – the provision 
of legal advice to operations versus advising in investigations – would help avoid conflicts 
of interest and promote a perception of independence. This may not be feasible for smaller 
armed forces with fewer legal advisors but, at a minimum, a legal advisor’s impartiality must 
be ensured. They must be excluded from an investigation if the investigation is examining 
behaviour or a course of action that was based on their legal advice (see Guideline 7). 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This document is the outcome of a project on Investigations in Armed Conflict, initiated in 2014 
by the Geneva Academy and joined in 2017 by the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). The Guidelines are the result of research undertaken, as well as consultations organised 
with a range of experts. 
 
Sources used for the research include governmental legal and policy documents where available 
in the public domain, military manuals and regulations where available in the public domain, 
international treaty and customary law, the case law of international and domestic courts, 
academic literature (books, journals, and articles), international organisation publications, and 
NGO reports (see Sources below).  
 
Expert exchanges took place at five expert meetings held over the course of five years,100 and 
further experts were consulted bilaterally. Experts included senior government lawyers, military 
lawyers, academics, staff of international organisations, and civil society organisations – from 
Africa, Asia, North and South America, Europe, and the Middle East. All experts participated in a 
personal capacity and are listed at the end of this document.  
 
 
  
                                                                   
100 The expert meetings were held on 14-15 July 2014 (Geneva, Switzerland); 7-8 September 2015 (Geneva, 
Switzerland); 23-24 March 2017 (The Hague, Netherlands); 12-13 April 2018 (Paris, France); and 1-2 April 2019 
(Geneva, Switzerland).  
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